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REGULATORY COOPERATION IN LATIN 
AMERICA: THE CASE OF MERCOSUR 




One of the principle aims of regulatory cooperation is to allow consumers to 
trust the quality of products in stores, supermarkets, and pharmacies, even if 
those products have not been designed, produced, packaged, or assembled in 
the consumer’s country. Such cooperation, in turn, permits traders from other 
countries to enter a new market without incurring the excessive costs involved 
in adapting to a new regulatory environment. In this sense, regulatory 
cooperation aspires to be a powerful tool of international trade policy. It 
purports to increase trade between nations by lowering the costs associated with 
differences in regulatory environments without increasing the risks for 
consumers. 
As explored in more detail below, regulatory cooperation can take many 
institutional forms that are the subject of intergovernmental negotiations. The 
most ambitious form of these institutions aims at regulatory harmonization—
the creation of a unified regulatory system between all the members of a trade 
zone. Regulatory cooperation can, however, rely on other institutional 
arrangements with less ambitious objectives. It can, for example, purport to 
achieve mutual recognition—allowing products lawfully sold in one member 
country of the trade zone to be sold in the other member countries without fully 
complying with the importing country’s domestic regulatory requirements.1 
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 1.  A famous example of (judicially imposed) “mutual recognition” is the Cassis de Dijon decision 
of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). There, a German importer of spirits challenged the refusal of 
German authorities to allow the importation of French-produced currant liqueur on the ground that its 
alcohol content was too low to be considered a liqueur for the purpose of a German technical 
regulation. The Court held that Germany was, in principle, bound by the principle of the common 
market enshrined in the EC treaty to allow the importation of the liqueur “provided that [it] had been 
lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States.” See Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
PRADO & BERTRAND_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2016  2:41 PM 
206 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78: 205 
The academic literature has raised a series of important questions regarding 
how ambitious regulatory cooperation should be,2 what mechanisms can be 
used to guarantee import safety,3 what governance structures are associated 
with regulatory cooperation,4 and the challenges of allowing countries to 
exercise regulatory sovereignty while curtailing protectionism and other 
obstacles to international trade.5 These are all important questions, but they all 
focus on the purpose and design of regulatory cooperation itself. 
Instead of engaging with these questions, this article examines the 
relationship between regulatory cooperation efforts and domestic regulatory 
structures. This topic has gained increased relevance in the specialized literature 
in recent years, and scholars have proposed a series of interesting analyses 
about this complex relationship. Gregory Shaffer, for instance, shows how 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules impose constraints that end up directly 
or indirectly shaping the regulatory state.6 Daphne Barak-Erez and Oren Perez 
look beyond the WTO rules and map the multiple ways in which international 
rules, regulations, and standards set up by a series of international institutions 
affect national systems.7 Ruth Okediji asks how domestic institutions such as 
courts and regulatory bodies have created novel structures to comply with the 
TRIPS Agreement in a manner consistent with their domestic needs and in 
compliance with the terms of the agreement.8 In sum, there is an emerging 
literature that analyzes the complex interactions between international trade 
regulation and domestic institutions in general, particularly the regulatory state. 
This article offers yet another contribution to this literature by asking to 
what extent regulatory harmonization and cooperation efforts presuppose and 
depend upon domestic regulatory institutions. Most of the studies conducted 
thus far have focused either on the way in which international regulations limit 
or constrain national regulatory institutions9 or on the way in which national 
 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung Für Branntwein 1979 E.C.R 649, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 2.  Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: 
Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 5 (1998). 
 3.  ALAN SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS 
MARKETS (Brookings 1995). 
 4.  See generally CARY COGLIANESE ET AL., IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 1998).  
 5.  See generally TRACEY EPPS & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
WTO AND TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE (Tracey Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013).  
 6.  Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law Fourth 
Biennial Global Conference, Working Paper No. 2014/29, 2014), http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2480664.  
 7.  Daphne Barak-Erez & Oren Perez, Whose Administrative Law is it Anyway?: How Global 
Norms Reshape the Administrative State, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 455 (2013). 
 8.  Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations: Revisiting 
Twenty Years of the TRIPS Agreements (Oct. 1, 2014) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 
Innovation Law & Policy Workshop at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law) (on file with 
authors).  
 9.  See Shaffer, supra note 6; Barak-Erez & Perez, supra note 7. 
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and international organizations mutually reinforce each other, directly or 
indirectly.10 These analyses assume: (1) that there is a regulatory structure or a 
regulatory state operating in the countries engaged in trade and (2) that these 
regulatory structures are fully functional.11 These two assumptions, however, are 
not necessarily accurate in many developing countries. Lack of domestic 
institutional capacity may have an impact on international processes that 
depend upon such structures. David Levy Faur and Jacint Jordana have argued 
that weaknesses in domestic regulatory institutions in Latin America have 
largely undermined the strength of transnational regulatory networks: 
[In] [o]ur study of transnational Latin American regulatory governance in 
telecoms . . . we find that their presence and functions are more limited than one 
would expect compared with Slaughter’s expectations in her New World Order and 
they also have a long way to go before they become effective instruments for regional 
development or regional integration as expected by the ambitions of Bruszt and 
McDermott and probably all of us . . . . The constraints over the development of the 
regional regulatory governance are first of all domestic. These include limited regional 
identity and weakness of the domestic players (regulatory agencies, business 
association and government officials).
12
 
In the same vein, this article asks what happens to regulatory cooperation 
efforts when the countries involved lack the regulatory structures necessary to 
design and implement such regimes. To address this question, this article 
analyzes the case of Mercosur, an attempt to create a common market in Latin 
America. More specifically, the article analyzes the efforts to promote 
regulatory cooperation in Mercosur, mapping the varying strategies adopted 
since its creation13 in three areas: competition law, technical regulations, and 
sanitary and phytosanitary requirements (SPS) measures. 
Mercosur is an interesting case because in its member states’ efforts to 
create a common market, the states sought the most ambitious goal of 
regulatory cooperation—harmonization.14 However, Mercosur has not resorted 
to supranational institutions that create binding rules that are immediately 
enforceable in member states. Instead, Mercosur’s member states have opted 
 
 10.  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
 11.  See, e.g., supra notes 6–9. 
 12.  Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, Regional Integration and Transnational Regulatory 
Regimes: The Polycentric Architecture of Governance in Latin American Telecommunications 20–21 
(unpublished manuscript) (internal citations omitted), http://www.globalreg-
project.net/files/9513/3069/8580/jordana_levi_faur_regional_integration_and_transnational_regulatory_
regimes.pdf; see also Sofía Boza, Assessing the Impact of Sanitary, Phytosanitary and Technical 
Requirements on Food and Agricultural Trade: What Does Current Research Tell Us? 20 (SECO/WTI 
Academic Cooperation Project, Working Paper 2/2013, 2013), http://www.wti.org/fileadmin/user_ 
upload/wti.org/7_SECO-
WTI_Project/Publications/SPS_TBT_on_food_and_agricultural_trade_Sofia_Boza.pdf (intuiting that 
the success of Chile as a major exporter of agricultural goods is connected with the development of 
food quality and safety institutions).  
 13.  The Treaty of Asunción was signed in 1990 and marks the beginning of the transition period. 
Article 1 of the Treaty provides that the Common Market shall be formed by the end of 1994; the 
Common Market was set up with the signature of the Ouro Preto Protocol. Treaty Establishing a 
Common Market art. 1, Mar. 26, 1991, 1041 I.L.M. 1044. 
 14.  Id. (“The State Parties hereby decide to establish a common market . . . .”). 
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for an institutional arrangement that relies heavily on the existence of 
functional domestic regulatory institutions. This choice seems particularly 
interesting when one considers that the existence of robust and functional 
regulatory institutions varies considerably from country to country in the 
region. 
This article suggests that Mercosur’s reliance on domestic regulatory 
institutions has proven to be an obstacle to the harmonization process. For 
instance, neither Uruguay nor Paraguay had a competition authority at the time 
Mercosur set the goal of harmonizing antitrust legislation.15 Thus, the 
harmonization process became largely dependent on the political will of 
domestic governments to implement and create the necessary regulatory 
structures. In an attempt to address these shortcomings, the member states of 
Mercosur seem to be abandoning the aim of promoting harmonization in favor 
of milder forms of regulatory cooperation with less ambitious objectives. 
However, it is not fully clear if such a decision will address the basic underlying 
problem in many countries in the region—a lack of effective and reliable 
regulatory institutions that can productively engage with and contribute to the 
international regulatory cooperation process. 
This argument should not be viewed as a rejection or even an 
understatement of the role played by political considerations and economic 
circumstances. On the contrary, these political and economic factors have 
played an important role in the way member countries have behaved, and 
Mercosur has evolved since its creation. Perhaps in a distinctly Latin American 
fashion, the process of integration within Mercosur has been primarily the 
result of decisions of the executive branches of the member states.16 This 
tendency may have made Mercosur vulnerable to the emergence of electoral 
and economic contingencies. The economic crisis that spread across the 
continent at the turn of the twenty-first century has undoubtedly triggered 
protectionist rather than integrationist responses from member states and has 
thus slowed down the integration process.17 Acknowledging this, this article tries 
 
 15.  See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.  
 16.  See GIAN LUCA GARDINI, THE ORIGINS OF MERCOSUR: DEMOCRACY AND 
REGIONALIZATION IN SOUTH AMERICA 127 (2010) (“[I]t was precisely the limited nature of the 
Argentine and Brazilian liberal democracies that allowed the executives to pursue an exclusionary and 
insular foreign policy that speeded up the integration process.”). 
 17.  See, e.g., Honorio Kume et al., Identificação das Barreiras ao Comércio no Mercosul: A 
Percepção das Empresas Exportadoras Brasileiras, 23 PLANEJAMENTO E POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS (2001); 
Miguel F. Lengyel & Valentina Delich, Multiple Paths Toward Regime Building?: SPS Regulation in the 
MERCOSUR, in LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY INTEGRATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT 206, 211–12 (Laszlo Bruszt & Gerald A. McDermott eds., 2014); Ricardo Andrés 
Markwald, Mercosul: Beyond 2000, in THE EUROPEAN UNION, MERCOSUL, AND THE NEW WORLD 
ORDER 84 n.37 (Helio Jaguaribe & Álvaro de Vasconcelos eds., 2004); Luís Rodolfo Cruz e Creuz, A 
construção da defesa da concorrência no MERCOSUL : uma perspectiva construtivista - cooperação e 
interesses nas relações internacionais (2010) (unpublished Masters thesis, Unicamp, Department of 
International Relations) (http://www.bibliotecadigital.unicamp.br/zeus/auth.php?back=http:// 
www.bibliotecadigital.unicamp.br/document/?code=000774937&go=x&code=x&unit=x); André Filipe 
Zago de Azevedo, Mercosur: Ambitious Policies, Poor Practices, 24 BRAZ. J. POL. ECON. 484 (2004).  
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to add yet another layer to the analysis—the institutions. This institutional story 
is meant to complement the political and economic explanations by delving into 
an important piece of the puzzle in Mercosur’s integration process. 
II 
THE ROLE OF REGULATORY COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
A. Why Regulatory Cooperation is Crucial to International Trade 
Since the Enlightenment and the writings of Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo, the orthodox view among trade scholars has been that the 
development of international trade leads to increases in productivity and 
economic growth.18 Although the elimination of tariffs is usually the first move 
to promote international trade, the elimination of regulatory costs is also 
fundamental to achieve this goal. The fragmentation of domestic regulatory 
regimes generates transaction costs as well as production costs because products 
may need to comply with different requirements in order to be lawfully sold in 
both the domestic and export markets.19 Costs also arise for traders when they 
need to prove that their products are compliant with all relevant standards and 
regulations.20 These regulatory differences, therefore, impose nontariff barriers 
to trade (NTBs). A series of such barriers—which can result from technical 
regulations (known as technical barriers to trade (TBT)), SPS requirements, 
and requirements related to quality and price control—exist. 
This hypothesis has been empirically tested in recent years. A strand of 
literature has quantified the effects of trade agreements purporting to reduce 
regulatory fragmentation on trade volume, showing that provisions for 
regulatory cooperation are correlated with increases in the volume of trade 
between the parties to the agreement.21 Naturally, this does not mean that the 
overall volume of trade will increase, but merely that trade between the parties 
to the agreement will increase.22 Free trade agreements, and possibly 
freestanding regulatory cooperation agreements, may create trade diversion—
 
 18.  MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & MARIANA MOTA PRADO, WHAT MAKES POOR COUNTRIES 
POOR?: INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF DEVELOPMENT 224–31 (2011). 
 19.  On the effect of regulatory fragmentation itself on trade, see, for example, Mauro Vigani et al., 
GMO Regulations, International Trade and the Imperialism of Standards (LICOS Ctr. for Insts. and 
Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 255/2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1571202.  
 20.  Silja Baller, Trade Effects of Regional Standards: A Heterogeneous Firms Approach (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4124, 2007). 
 21.  See generally Olivier Cadot et al., North-South Standards Harmonization and International 
Trade 6–8 (G-MonD, Working Paper No. 26, 2012), http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/ 
pdf/wp26-gmond-north-south-standards-sept2012.pdf.   
 22.  See, e.g., Baller, supra note 20, at 26 (finding “compelling evidence that Mutual Recognition 
Agreements for testing procedures have a strong impact on both export probabilities and bilateral 
trade volumes”); Maggie Xiaoyang Chen & Aaditya Mattoo, Regionalism in Standards: Good or Bad 
for Trade? 41 CAN. J. ECON. 838, 860 (2008) (“It is evident that harmonization and mutual recognition 
can have a positive impact on both the likelihood and the volume of trade within the region and with 
third countries.”). 
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that is, transfer the volume of trade that would have occurred with a third party 
to the other party to the trade agreement.23 
A recent study conducted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) highlights the prevalence of nontariff barriers in 
international trade in different regions,24 demonstrating the pressing need to 
address this issue. 
 
Figure 1: Frequency Index and Coverage Ratios by Chapter (by Region) 
 
Although regulations may potentially generate NTBs, they also 
concurrently protect fundamental societal interests. For example, technical 
regulations on food products are necessary to ensure food safety, and the 
imposition of technical regulations may help states to fight against the 
consumption of tobacco products.25 The challenge in international trade policy 
 
 23.  On the potential trade-diversion effect of Mercosur, see Alok K. Bohara et al., Trade 
Diversion and Declining Tariffs: Evidence from Mercosur 64 J. INT’L ECON. 65 (2004); Alexander 
Yeats, Does Mercosur’s Trade Performance Raise Concerns About the Effects of Regional Trade 
Agreements? (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 1729, 1997). 
 24.  U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Non-Tariff Measures to Trade: Economic and Policy 
Issues for Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2012/1 (2013). 
 25.  See, for example, the recent imposition by countries as diverse as Australia and Uruguay of 
technical regulations requiring that cigarettes be sold only in unappealing “plain packages” in order to 
discourage, for public health reasons, the consumption of tobacco. It is worth noting that the Australian 
legislation has been challenged in the WTO by numerous countries, notably on the basis of Article 2.1 
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
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is, therefore, to guarantee the protections offered by these rules and norms, 
while minimizing obstacles to trade.26 
B. Forms of Regulatory Cooperation 
A series of instruments of regulatory cooperation have been designed to 
address this challenge, including harmonization of technical regulations, 
harmonization of conformity-assessment procedures, mutual recognition or 
equivalence of technical regulations, mutual recognition or equivalence of 
conformity-assessment procedures, and information exchange and 
transparency.27 A recent study shows that mutual recognition of conformity-
assessment procedures is the most common instrument in free trade 
agreements, whereas harmonization of technical regulations is the second most 
common.28 
These instruments are, of course, very different. As briefly mentioned in the 
introduction, harmonization proceeds from an ambitious goal. It seeks to create 
one common set of regulations applicable to all members of the trade zone. The 
harmony brought to the regulatory environment brings with it legal certainty 
for traders and may, in some circumstances, bring about more equitable 
competition between producers in different countries in the trade zone.29 But 
harmonization assumes that all members of the trade zone, through 
intergovernmental or expert-led negotiations, are capable and willing to agree 
on this common set of rules. This agreement may, however, prove much more 
difficult than anticipated. Some regulations are culturally sensitive, thus making 
compromises on these regulations harder to reach.30 More importantly for our 
purposes, even when there is substantive agreement on some topics, 
institutional machinery to establish and enforce these norms is required. One 
solution is to establish supranational institutions, but these are expensive and 
 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 
121 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].  
 26.  So much is acknowledged by the preamble of the TBT Agreement itself: “No country should 
be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection 
of human, animal, or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive 
practices, at the levels it considers appropriate.” TBT Agreement, supra note 25, pmbl.  
 27.  Debra P. Steger, Institutions for Regulatory Cooperation in ‘New Generation’ Economic and 
Trade Agreements, 38 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 109, 109 (2012). 
 28.  Roberta Piermartini & Michele Budetta, A Mapping of Regional Rules on Technical Barriers 
to Trade, in REGIONAL RULES IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 250, 272–273 (Antoni 
Estevadeordal et al. eds., 2009).  
 29.  Take, for example, chemical products in toys. The enactment of one set of rules will enable toy 
traders to access the markets of all the countries in the trade zone without incurring any adjustment 
costs for each market. It will also ensure that toy traders from the zone do not gain unfair advantages 
from the more relaxed, or irresponsible, attitude of their domestic government in relation to those 
particular standards.  
 30.  In the case of Mercosur, an example of sociocultural difference as an obstacle to 
harmonization can be found in the attempts to harmonize labor relations and social security 
regulations. See MIGUEL A. SARDEGNA, LAS RELACIONES LABORALES EN EL MERCOSUR. Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones La Rocca, 1995. 
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complex. If the rule-making and rule-enforcing institutions are not 
supranational, the effort is most likely to rely on a specific and functional 
domestic institutional setup, as discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
In contrast, mutual recognition is often considered a way of “sidestepping 
the political and bureaucratic nightmare of harmonization.”31 Unlike 
harmonization, mutual recognition does not require the creation, 
implementation, and enforcement of new standards and regulations common to 
all members of the zone. The principle of mutual recognition is that products 
that are lawfully sold in one member state of the trade zone can be freely 
marketed in all other member states of the zone, even if they do not strictly 
comply with the latters’ regulations.32 This means that the principle of mutual 
recognition does not require, at least on its face, complex negotiations to create 
a common standard; instead, it merely proclaims the general principle that 
regulations in each and every country of the trade zone are equivalent and 
therefore cannot prevent the development of trade. 
C. Governance Structures of Regulatory Cooperation 
Although much attention has been paid to these different instruments of 
regulatory cooperation, Debra Steger shows that the success of regulatory 
cooperation efforts is likely to depend not only on the instrument chosen, but 
also on the institutions that are designed to create and enforce such 
instruments.33 In the aforementioned report, UNCTAD identifies three types of 
institutional arrangements to address issues related to NTBs: 
1. Supranational institutions, which may have a leading role in preparing 
and enforcing a consistent or, at least, nondiscriminatory regulatory 
environment; 
2. Regional agreements that can serve as “a political anchor for reform-
minded politicians with reformist agendas” to promote domestic reforms; and 
3. Regional institutions that operate as forums for discussion where member 
countries meet to debate and advance the cause of harmonizing technical-
regulation.34 
For UNCTAD, the European Union (EU) is a perfect example of the first 
situation, whereas the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a 
good example of the second, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) is of the third.35  Steger also distinguishes between preferential trade 
agreements that do not have institutions, such as NAFTA, and those that do 
 
 31.  Gareth Davies, Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonization?: Lessons on Trade and 
Tolerance of Diversity from the EU, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL 
SYSTEM 265, 266 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006).  
 32.  Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 2, at 50.  
 33.  Steger, supra note 27, at 126. 
 34.  U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., supra note 24, at 58. 
 35.  Id. 
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have institutions, such as the EU and ASEAN.36 Regarding the latter, however, 
she calls attention to the range of different institutional arrangements that may 
be implemented.37 For instance, the EU’s institutional setup is significantly 
different from the creation of joint regulatory agencies, that is, institutions that 
promote joint accreditation and harmonization systems. An example of the 
latter is the Australia–New Zealand Food Authority, created under the auspices 
of the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement. 
Each of these institutional arrangements is certainly important for regional 
integration as well as regulatory cooperation and harmonization efforts. 
However, some of these arrangements are more dependent on functional 
domestic institutions than others. To analyze the extent of this dependence, it is 
necessary to separate the rulemaking and the enforcement process. The 
rulemaking process is the point at which norms will be decided upon and will be 
a process independent of domestic institutions if supranational rulemaking 
institutions are given responsibility for it. Conversely, if rules are to be created 
by intergovernmental institutions, the process will largely depend on the ability 
of domestic regulatory institutions to participate in that rule-making process. 
And even if the rule-making process is fairly independent from domestic 
institutions, the enforcement process may not be. The system can be dependent 
on national institutions for the enforcement of supranational norms. The EU 
reflects the arrangement that is less dependent on functional domestic 
institutions, whereas NAFTA is an example that is highly dependent on 
functional domestic institutions. The other arrangements thus fall somewhere in 
between. 
The following parts of this article will explore the degree to which the 
institutional arrangements adopted by Mercosur are dependent on functional 
domestic regulatory institutions to achieve Mercosur’s initial, and ambitious, 
goal of regulatory harmonization. 
III 
THE NEED FOR FUNCTIONAL DOMESTIC REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS TO 
ACHIEVE EFFECTIVE REGULATORY COOPERATION 
Mercosur largely follows the pattern of international trade law in general 
when it comes to its treatment of domestic regulatory structures. Regulatory 
cooperation in Mercosur—whether through harmonization or mutual 
recognition—is mandated.38 The problem is that this mandate implicitly assumes 
the existence of functional domestic regulatory structures, and it therefore does 
not have mechanisms to deal with the cases in which this assumption may not 
hold. Or, and perhaps more accurately, Mercosur law—and one may argue that 
this is the case for other regulatory cooperation efforts in international trade 
 
 36.  Steger, supra note 27, at 110–16. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Treaty Establishing a Common Market, supra note 13, art 1, at 1044–45. 
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law more generally—presupposes and relies extensively on the existence of 
functional regulatory institutions within the state parties to trade agreements. 
The question is what happens when these institutions do not exist or are not 
fully functional. To answer this question, a better understanding of the 
relationship between efforts to promote regulatory cooperation and their 
dependence on domestic institutions is necessary. The case study of Mercosur 
unpacks this complex relationship between regulatory cooperation efforts and 
domestic institutions. The following sections delve into the efforts of regulatory 
cooperation in Mercosur on both competition policy and technical regulations. 
A. Competition Policy 
The founding treaty of Mercosur establishes an ambitious goal: the 
“common market shall involve . . . the co-ordination of macroeconomic and 
sectoral policies . . . in order to ensure proper competition between the State 
Parties; [and] [t]he commitment by State Parties to harmonize their legislation 
in the relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process.”39 However, 
unlike the founding treaties of the EU,40 the Treaty of Asunción does not 
include a competition chapter nor does it create a regional competition 
authority. The creation of regional competition authorities may be an 
appropriate response to the lack of expertise, independence, and resources at 
the domestic level, which tends to weaken national competition authorities in 
developing countries.41 However, Mercosur has not decided to follow this path, 
resulting in a series of difficulties that have forced member states to 
progressively adjust their expectations regarding how much can be achieved on 
this front. 
In short, the efforts of Mercosur to promote regulatory harmonization in the 
field of competition policy have failed. The initial focus on harmonization of 
competition laws, brought about by the Fortaleza Protocol, was not achieved 
because it required regulatory capabilities that at least some of the members 
simply did not possess. 
1. The Failure of Regulatory Harmonization in Competition Law: The 
Demise of the Fortaleza Protocol 
In 1996, the Protocol on the Protection of Competition (known as the 
Fortaleza Protocol)42 together with its annex on sanctions43 became the main 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 101, 102, 
106–108, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 41.  See Marco Botta, The Role of Competition Policy in the Latin American Regional Integration: 
A Comparative Analysis of Caricom, Andean Community and Mercosur 3 (Oct. 21–22, 2011) (paper 
presented at the IX Annual Conference of the Euro-Latin Study Network on Integration and Trade) 
(on file with authors).   
 42.  Protocolo de Defensa de la Competencia del MERCOSUR, Decisión CCM No. 18/96 (1996), 
http://www.mercosur.int/t_ligaenmarco.jsp?contentid=4823&site=1&channel=secretaria>. 
 43.  Comisión de Comercio del Mercosur, Reunión XX, Acta 02/97 (1997).  
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instruments promoting regulatory harmonization of competition laws among 
Mercosur member countries. Regarding the governance structure, the Protocol 
establishes a complex bureaucratic procedure and complicated political 
structure to control mergers and acquisitions and to sanction anticompetitive 
behavior. At the top level, there is a Competition Committee, where decisions 
are all made by consensus, thus giving veto power to member states when their 
national interests are affected. To counter this risk, the representatives of the 
states in the committee were supposed to also be members of the national 
competition authorities—the idea was that these representatives would be 
independent from their governments. The enforcement system designed by the 
Protocol relied on national competition regulators to carry out the 
investigations into anticompetitive conduct and to impose sanctions. In sum, the 
competition-governance structure of Mercosur was entirely dependent on 
functional and independent domestic competition authorities. 
To some extent, the Fortaleza Protocol was stillborn. On the one hand, the 
governance structure adopted may have increased the chances of success of the 
regional instrument because it was politically more palatable than a 
supranational body. On the other hand, the heavy reliance of the enforcement 
mechanisms on domestic institutions seems to be a very real contributor to its 
failure. Crucially, at the time of the Protocol’s signature, half of the member 
states, Uruguay and Paraguay, did not have any form of domestic competition 
legislation nor, a fortiori, a competition regulator.44 
Of course, the negotiators of the member states may have designed the 
Protocol hoping that it would induce those countries to reform their 
competition laws. And, to some extent, the Protocol may indeed have created 
some impetus for reform, notably in Paraguay, where the Wasmosy 
administration circulated draft competition legislation in 1996.45 Brazil also 
passed a new competition law in 1994,46 and Argentina did the same in 1999.47 
However, over time it became clear that the negotiators were overly optimistic. 
The Paraguayan Parliament only enacted the first competition legislation in the 
country’s history in June 2013.48 Uruguay only introduced a competition law in 
2007,49 and though the competition authority created by this law, the 
 
 44.  44. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., supra note 24; Botta, supra note 41, at 12–13. 
 45.   M. Rowat, M. Lubrano and R. Porrata, Jr., ‘Competition Policy and Mercosur’ World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 385 (1997), at 60–70. 
 46.  Ley No. 8.884, de 6 junho de 1994 DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 11.6.1994 (Braz.).  
 47.  Law. No. 25.156, de 25 de agosoto de 1999, de Defensa de la Competencia (modified by 
Decreto No. 396/2001) (Arg.), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/es/details.jsp?id=100; F. Peña, Una Política 
de Competencia Económica en el MERCOSUR, BOLETÍN LATINOAMERICANO DE COMPETENCIA 17 
(2001). 
 48.   Ley No. 4956, de 25 junio de 2013, de Defensa de la Competencia (Para.), 
http://www.mic.gov.py/mic/site/comercio/pdf/conacom/Ley_4956.pdf; R. Hall, Paraguay Enacts First 
Ever Competition Law, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (2013), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ 
news/article /33715/paraguay-enacts-first-ever-competition-law/. 
 49.  Daniel Hargain, Nueva Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, BOLETÍN LATINOAMERICANO DE 
COMPETENCIA, Septiembre 2007, at 102; Botta, supra note 41, at 14. 
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Commission of Promotion and Protection of Competition, was implemented in 
2009, it is under the control of the Ministry of Economy and Finances, rather 
than being independent.50 Tavares de Araujo has argued that the significant 
delays in competition law reforms means that “[w]hen the protocol was signed, 
Brazil was the only country that had the proper instruments to enforce the 
regional disciplines.”51 
Brazil has largely been lauded for the quality of its competition legislation 
and the independence, at least formally, of its regulatory bodies.52 It has been 
described as “the most advanced [national competition authority] in the 
region.”53 The combination of the quality of the Brazilian regulator and of 
Brazil’s quick ratification of the Protocol could have allowed Brazil to take a 
leadership role in Mercosur. However, Brazil never took up the task of 
promoting competition law reforms in the other member states, and it also 
refused to collaborate with Argentina. Botta reports that senior Brazilian 
competition officials distrust their Argentinean counterparts for the lack of 
independence of the Argentine regulatory agency.54 
2. Reducing the Ambition: Mutual Recognition 
Although the lack of functional regulatory domestic institutions is not the 
only factor that can potentially explain the failure of the Fortaleza Protocol, it is 
certainly an important contributing one. The lack of domestic institutions 
remains relevant when the harmonization goal is replaced by the goal of 
regulatory cooperation. This happened in 2004 when member states signed an 
Agreement on Cooperation for the Application of its National Competition 
Laws.55 Although this agreement establishes a regime of cooperation completely 
independent from any Mercosur institution, it still relies heavily on domestic 
institutions. Having recognized in its preamble the centrality of cooperation,56 
the agreement institutes two mechanisms designed to further the “defence of 
competition” in Mercosur: 
1. National competition agencies may refer cases of anticompetitive 
practices occurring in another Mercosur country but that have an impact in its 
 
 50.  Ley No. 18.159, de 30 julio de 2007, de la Promoción y Defensa de la Competencia, Publicada 
D.O. No. 27288 (Uru.), http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=18159 
&Anchor=. 
 51.  José Tavares de Araujo Jr., Toward a Competition Policy in Mercosur 4, Apr. 23–24, 2001 
(note prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank’s Infrastructure and Financial Markets 
Division and Multilateral Investment Fund Competition Policy in Infrastructure Services Conference, 
2001), http://www.sedi.oas.org/DTTC/TRADE/PUB/STAFF_ARTICLE/tav01_merc_e.asp. 
 52.  Botta, supra note 41, at 14. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Mercado Común del Sur [MERCOSUR], Entendimiento Sobre Cooperación Entre las 
Autoridades de Defense de la Competencia de los Estados Partes del Mercosur Para la Aplicación de sus 
Leyes Nacionales de Competencia, MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 04/04 (2004) (on file with authors).  
 56.  Id. pmbl. 
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territory to the competition agency of that country; and57 
2. National competition agencies are to take into account the interests of 
other member states when dealing with anticompetitive practices.58 
The decision also provides for more informal discussions between officials 
of national domestic competition agencies but does not, rather surprisingly, 
provide for any time frame for those discussions.59 
This agreement was followed in 2005 by the Agreement on Cooperation 
among Member States for the Control of Mergers and Acquisitions in the 
Region.60 The aspiration of this agreement is very similar to the earlier one. It 
recalls the importance of “cooperation” while making no mention of Mercosur 
institutions to foster such cooperation.61 The agreement sets rules relating to 
both the exchange of information in merger-and-acquisition cases and also the 
coordination of responses to those cases.62 In other words, this agreement 
assumes that Mercosur members have functional domestic regulatory 
institutions in the field of competition law and relies completely on their 
existence in order for responses to be effectively carried out. 
This system of cooperation showed early signs of success. The Brazilian 
regulator, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Conselho 
Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, or CADE), made use of the mechanism 
when it handled the proposed acquisition of the glass-reinforcement and 
composite-fabrics assets of Saint-Gobain by Owens Corning in 2006 through 
2007.63 In this case, the head of CADE decided to notify the competition 
regulators of the three other Mercosur countries of his decision and made 
explicit reference to Decision 15/06.64  
This early success, however, has not been replicated. Thus, the need to 
strengthen the regulatory cooperation mechanisms is clear. These reforms were 
inspired by the acknowledgment by some high officials that “leaner” forms of 
regulatory cooperation were more appropriate in the Mercosur context.65 
Tavares, a high official in Brazil, argued that Brazil and Argentina should 
engage in bilateral cooperation outside the formal boundaries of the Fortaleza 
Protocol following the models of cooperation between the EU and the United 
States or Australia and New Zealand.66 This, he argues, would enable Brazil and 
Argentina to gain the “practical knowledge engendered by this experience” 
 
 57.  Id. at art. IV.  
 58.  Id. at art. I(1). 
 59.  Id. at art. VIII.  
 60.  MERCOSUR, Entendimiento Sobre Cooperación Entre las Autoridades de Defensa de la 
Competencia de los Estados Partes del Mercosur Para el Control de Concentraciones Económicas de 
Ámbito Regional, MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 15/06 (2006) (on file with authors).  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at art. IV.  
 63.  Botta, supra note 41, at 13. 
 64.  Ato de Concentração No. 08012.001885/2007-11 de 28 de julho de 2008, D.O.U. (Braz.). 
 65.  Tavares de Araujo, supra note 51, at 4. 
 66.  Id. 
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necessary to reform the Fortaleza Protocol and to assist Uruguay and Paraguay 
in putting in place the required technical assistance.67 And there were important 
domestic changes in at least one member country, Uruguay. The two Mercosur 
agreements signed in 2004 and 2005 were shortly followed by the creation of 
competition legislation and a competition regulator in the country in 2006 and 
2007, respectively.68 
In 2010, Mercosur’s Council for the Common Market (CCM) revoked the 
Fortaleza Protocol and its annex on sanctions and, in its place, enacted an 
Agreement on Protection of Competition in Mercosur.69 As explained above, 
the previous model created a complex bureaucratic procedure and political 
process: member states would collect the information and submit the cases for 
analysis and decision by the Competition Committee, which was made up of 
representatives of all member states and made decisions by consensus. In 
contrast, the new model is based on consultations among the competition 
authorities of member states. It abandons the idea of harmonizing the antitrust 
norms applicable to all member states and relies instead on cooperation and 
coordination, strengthening the two agreements on cooperation signed in 2004 
and 2006.70 
Although this new agreement looks promising, it still heavily relies on 
functional domestic regulatory institutions. Due to this reliance, much 
uncertainty remains on how the agreement will evolve. The agreement still 
remains to be internalized by all member states, except Argentina.71 
Internalization requires that each country enact the terms of the agreement as 
enforceable norms in the domestic sphere—either as a statute, executive decree, 
or regulation, depending on the country. 
B. Technical Barriers to Trade 
The story to be told in relation to cooperation on TBT is somewhat less 
clear cut than the story on competition policy. On its face, regulatory 
cooperation in this field has indeed yielded positive results. As this section 
demonstrates, those achievements cannot cloud the fact that the mechanisms of 
regulatory cooperation in Mercosur have, to a large extent, failed to appreciate 
the consequences of the lack of functional regulatory structures in at least some 
member states. 
 
 67.  Id. at 5. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  MERCOSUR, Acuerdo de Defensa de la Competencia del Mercosur, 
MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No. 43/10 (2010) (on file with authors). 
 70.  Luís Rodolfo Cruz e Creuz, Há Novos Ventos na Defesa da Concorrência no Mercosul, 
CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.conjur.com.br/2011-set-15/novos-ventos-defesa-
concorrencia-ambito-mercosul.  
 71.  Updated information on internalization of Mercosur norms is available at ESTADO DE 
RATIFICACIONES Y VIGENCIAS DE TRATADOS Y PROTOCOLOS DEL MERCOSUR Y 
ESTADOS ASOCIADOS. For 2010 decisions, see http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/ 
2376/2/innova.front/decisiones_2010. 
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Similarly to competition policies, the Treaty of Asunción placed regulatory 
harmonization of TBT measures72 as one of the cornerstones of the economic 
integration project.73 However, in contrast to competition policy, there has been 
some significant progress in this area: Mercosur has enacted a number of 
technical rules that have, in turn, been internalized by the member states. The 
achievements of Mercosur in this field can be attributed to two institutions: 
Sub-Working Group 3 (SGT 3) on Technical Standards created in 1991 under 
the auspices of the Common Market Group and later, from 1997 onwards, by 
the Association for Standardization (AMN). 
SGT 3 was coordinated by each country’s institution responsible for 
measurements, standards, and production quality.74 In accordance with the 
obligations imposed by the WTO Agreements,75 SGT 3 has often created 
technical regulations on the basis of international standards formulated by 
international organizations such as ISO/IEC, Codex Alimentarius, and also on 
the basis of international norms created by international organizations, such as 
the United Nations.76 This process, which adheres to the WTO TBT Agreement, 
requires Mercosur countries to use international technical standards as a basis 
for their domestic technical regulations “except when such international 
standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for 
the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued.”77 In practical terms, this 
requires the member states to engage in complex considerations of the ends 
pursued (for example, the level of acceptable risk for the purpose of the 
protection of human health), as well as the means to achieve those ends (for 
 
 72.  The TBT Agreement defines technical regulation as a “[d]ocument which lays down product 
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a product, 
process or production method.” TBT Agreement, supra note 25, annex 1. Technical regulations may 
take varying forms: prohibitions or restrictions of imports for objectives set out in the TBT Agreement 
(e.g., import authorization for firearms); tolerance limits for residue and restricted use of substances 
(e.g., sulphur content in Champagne exceed X mg/l); labeling, marking, and packaging requirements 
(e.g., wine must carry a label indicating the alcoholic content); production or post-production 
requirements (e.g., milk must be stored below a particular temperature); product identity requirements 
(e.g., a  product can only be identified as “chocolate” if it contains a minimum of 30% cocoa); product 
quality or performance requirements (e.g., concrete must resist up to 200 bar of pressure). U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Dev., supra note 24, at 90–93 (providing illustrative list).  
 73.  Treaty Establishing a Common Market, supra note 13, art. 1, at 1045.  
 74.  In Brazil, this institution was the Instituto Nacional de Metrologia, Normalização e Qualidade 
Industrial (INMETRO); in Argentina, the Secretaría de la Competencia, la Desregulación y de la 
Defensa del Consumidor; in Paraguay, the Instituto Nacional de Technología, Normalización y 
Metrología (INTN); and in Uruguay the Laboratorio Technológico del Uruguay (LATU). 
 75.   See MARINA FOLTEA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: 
HOW MUCH INSTITUTIONAL SENSITIVITY? 245–79 (2012) (chapter entitled “The World Health 
Organization and the Codex Alimentarius Commission”). 
 76.  See INMETRO, Mercosul e Barreiras Técnicas, http://www.inmetro.gov.br/barreirastecnicas/ 
mercosul.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2015). This became mandatory in 2000 when the TBT Agreement was 
formally incorporated into Mercosur’s legal framework by Decision CCM 58/00, which adopts the TBT 
Agreement for the MERCOSUR and, therefore, incorporates its processes.  
 77.  TBT Agreement, supra note 21, art. 2.4.  
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example, what level of chemical components is required to achieve that 
objective).  
In sum, the process of regulatory cooperation in SGT 3 relied heavily on the 
existence of functional domestic institutions. Rather surprisingly, perhaps, and 
in reliance on the participation of the national bodies of the member states, 
SGT 3 informally established subcommissions responsible for specific economic 
sectors.78 Results appeared soon thereafter. In 1991, the Common Market 
Group (GMC) established standards for the automotive industry79 and 
industrialized canned food as a result of the work of these commissions.80 By the 
end of the transition period, in 1995, SGT 3 was responsible for fifty percent of 
the norms enacted by the GMC.81 
These achievements are, to a large extent, nothing more than a can’t-see-the 
forest-for-the-trees problem. Indeed, in contrast to norm production, 
ratification and internalization of the technical standards was slow and, in some 
cases, never happened.82 For instance, only in 2002 did Brazil ratify a GMC 
Resolution enacted in 1995 (Resolution n.23/1995) regarding mutual 
recognition of pharmaceutical products registered in one Mercosur country.83 A 
1996 resolution to create a harmonized registry for medical products84 was never 
ratified by any member countries and was replaced by a new one in 2000. 
Uruguay’s government estimated that only half of the 1,024 norms approved by 
the bloc by 1999 had been incorporated in the domestic legal orders of the 
member states by 2000.85 Similarly, in 2001, a survey of 4,494 Brazilian 
companies operating in the footwear, steel, and poultry industries indicated that 
nontariff barriers—in particular, TBT and SPS measures—were the most 
important obstacles to trade.86 This has been a significant obstacle for trade in 
Mercosur. 
The 1997 creation of the AMN has also yielded positive results for 
Mercosur. The AMN assumed the role previously performed by the Mercosur 
Standardization Committee.87 It has three objectives: (1) harmonization of 
national standards, (2) alignment of the positions of the members in 
 
 78.  Adriano Braga de Melo & Fernando Goulart, A Eliminação de Barreiras Técnicas no 
Mercosul 5 (INMETRO Subgrupo de Trabalho, Paper No. 3, 2003), http://www.inmetro. 
gov.br/inovacao/artigos/docs/3.pdf.  
 79.  Grupo Mercado Común, Acta 04/91, Res. 9/91, “Normas Técnicas Armonizadas sobre 
Requisitos de Seguridad, Ruidos y Emisión de Vehículos” [“Car Safety, Noise and Emissions”] (1991).  
 80.  Grupo Mercado Común, Acta 04/91, Res. 10/91, “Norma MERCOSUR sobre Rotulado de 
Alimentos Envasados” [“Labeling of Packaged Food”] (1991). 
 81.  Braga de Melo & Goulart, supra note 78, at 6. 
 82.  THOMAS ANDREW O’KEEFE, LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
KEYS TO A PROSPEROUS COMMUNITY OF THE AMERICAS 182 (2009). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Grupo Mercado Común, Acta 02/96, Res. 37/96, “Registro Armonizado de Productos 
Médicos” [“Harmonized Registry for Medical Products”] (1996). 
 85.   Informe MERCOSUR, Inter-American Development Bank 74 (1999–2000). 
 86.  Kume et al., supra note 17. 
 87.  Braga de Melo & Goulart, supra note 78, at 7.  
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international standardization bodies, and (3) promotion and mutual recognition 
of certification systems.88 The AMN is an independent nonprofit private entity, 
separate from the structure of Mercosur, and it is entitled to work in 
cooperation with Mercosur as long as its composition includes national 
standardization bodies of all member states.89 In other words, like the SGT 3, 
the AMN relies heavily on the participation of functional domestic regulatory 
institutions. In terms of standard production, the AMN remains active, setting 
up voluntary standards and possessing the power to propose the incorporation 
of these into the mandatory norms enacted by the GMC.90 
It must be acknowledged that, in recent years, some countries have made 
significant progress toward the implementation of Mercosur technical 
regulations. This is especially the case for the smaller countries—Uruguay and 
Paraguay. As of November 2011, seventy-seven technical regulations were in 
force in Uruguay. Of this total, forty-eight percent of the rules adopted 
implemented Mercosur standards.91 Similarly, in Paraguay, there has been 
recent implementation in 2006, 2008, and 2010, but en masse: 
Paraguay has incorporated MERCOSUR’s regulations on TBTs by means of Decree 
No. 8.064/06, which contains 76 GMC resolutions on foodstuffs, toys and metrology, 
inter alia; Decree No. 12.085/08, containing 23 GMC resolutions on the labeling of 
textiles, foodstuffs and pre-packaged goods, inter alia; and Decree No. 4.432/10, which 
incorporates a GMC resolution on the definition of alcoholic beverages.
92
 
Although the number of regulatory enactments by Uruguay and Paraguay is 
impressive, it is important to remember that both countries took a long time to 
internalize the rules enacted. 
In this case there may have been functional regulatory institutions in most, if 
not all, member countries that allowed for such recent progress. TBT measures 
seem to illustrate something important about domestic institutional capacity, 
which is the focus of this article's analysis. The national administrative 
capabilities were particularly heterogeneous at the beginning of the 
harmonization efforts, and this may have contributed to this slow pace and lack 
of internalization. Indeed, Argentina and Brazil already had a multitude of 
strong domestic institutions in 1991,93 whereas Uruguay and Paraguay had only 
 
 88.  MERCOSUR, MERCOSUR/GMC/81/00 (2000) (on file with authors).  
 89.  Cooperation Agreement between Mercosur and AMN, Arts. 3–4, 
http://www.amn.org.br/Paginas/Paginas/5?url=Documentos. 
 90.  O’Keefe, supra note 82, at 182. 
 91.  See WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY, TRADE POLICY REVIEW REPORT BY THE 
SECRETARIAT: URUGUAY, WT/TPR/S/263, at Table III.1 (Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter URUGUAY 
TRADE POLICY REVIEW]. 
 92.  WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY, TRADE POLICY REVIEW REPORT BY THE 
SECRETARIAT: PARAGUAY, WT/TPR/S/245, at 56 (Mar. 23, 2011) [hereinafter PARAGUAY TRADE 
POLICY REVIEW].  
 93.  In Brazil, a national system of metrology, normalization, and industrial quality was established 
in 1973. Since then, the system has included two regulatory institutions in charge of ‘technical matters’: 
the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO) and the 
National Council of Metrology, Normalization and Industrial Quality (CONMETRO). In Argentina, 
the national system of norms, quality, and certification, which includes regulatory institutions such as 
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a bare bones structure at the time (Laboratorio Technológico del Uruguay and 
Instituto Nacional de Technología, Normalización y Metrología, respectively). 
In recent years, significant changes have been implemented to the point that 
Paraguay and Uruguay have finally acquired the capacity to engage 
meaningfully in the process of regulatory cooperation. Paraguay restructured 
the Instituto Nacional’s governance structure in 2005.94 This reform also created 
a national system of notification and information on technical regulations and 
conformity-assessment procedures.95 This system allows Paraguay to comply 
with the notification, transparency, and information obligations under the WTO 
TBT Agreement and to coordinate and define positions for negotiations at the 
international; regional, through Mercosur; and bilateral levels. The results are 
visible: until 2006 Paraguay had made no notifications to the WTO Committee 
on TBT, but since then the country has made thirty-two notifications. Paraguay 
also created the Technical Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade in 2009.96 
Similarly, Uruguay created the National Quality Institute in 2005, which 
governs conformity assessments,97 and the Uruguayan Standardization, 
Accreditation, Metrology and Conformity Assessment Scheme in 2010.98 These 
changes may be connected to and partially explain the recent surge of 
internalization of Mercosur technical regulations in these two countries. The 
recent inclusion of Venezuela as a new member in the trade bloc99 is likely to 
provide an opportunity to test this hypothesis empirically. 
The strengthening of domestic institutions, it may be suggested, have proved 
more efficient than other attempts to overcome the lack of domestic 
implementation of Mercosur technical regulations. One such attempt is that of 
mutual recognition agreements among member countries, such as the one 
signed between Brazil and Argentina on toy safety and quality certification.100 
Similar to the other arrangements discussed in this article, this type of 
agreement depends on the existence of functional domestic regulatory 
institutions, which was not a problem in this case as both Argentina and Brazil 
 
the Argentine Institute of Normalization and Certification (IRAM) and the Argentine Organization of 
Accreditation (OAA), was only created by decree in 1994. IRAM, however, had been established as 
early as 1937. 
 94.  See REPUBLICA DEL PARAGUAY, LEY NO 2575/2005: DE REFORMA DE LA CARTA ORGANICA 
DEL INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE TECHNOLOGIA Y NORMALIZACION (INTN), 
http://www.intn.gov.py/intn/sites/default/files/paginas_archivos/carta-organica-intn.pdf (last visited Jan. 
6, 2015). 
 95.  Dec. No. 6.499/05, 18 octubre 2005 (Para.). 
 96.  Dec. No. 1.765/09, 3 abril 2009 (Para.). 
 97.  Ley No. 17.930, de 17 de diciembre de 2005, Publicada D.O. 23 de diciembre de 2005 (Uru.). 
 98.   URUGUAY TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 91, at 70, (indicating that under Decree No. 
89/010 of Feb. 26, 2010, the governing body of the Uruguayan Standardization, Accreditation, 
Metrology and Conformity Assessment Scheme is composed of representatives of several ministries 
including Industry, Energy and Mining, Economy and Finance, Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries, 
and of the Planning and Budget Office (OPP)). 
 99.  Venezuela Joins Mercosur Trading Bloc, BBC (July 31, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
latin-america-19069591.  
 100.  de Azevedo, supra note 17, at 598 (providing a nonexhaustive list). 
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had such institutions in place. But this type of mechanism also depends on the 
political will of the countries involved and has therefore encountered two 
problems. First, some member countries may decide not to sign the mutual 
recognition agreement. Second, such agreements can be unilaterally suspended, 
which happened to the Brazil–Argentina agreement when Argentina suspended 
it in November 2009.101 
A second attempt at strengthening the domestic institutional structures has 
been memoranda of understanding or agreements on technical cooperation. 
These agreements, like mutual recognition agreements, rely heavily on the 
existence of functional regulatory institutions in at least one of the member 
countries signing the agreement. Brazil has established such agreements with 
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.102  
A third attempt to strengthen domestic institutions has been the creation of 
voluntary standards by AMN, which evolved into de facto rules in the industry. 
Indeed, by 2009, AMN had established 550 voluntary norms for products to be 
sold within Mercosur.103 These are technical standards, however, and the GMC 
has not been fast enough at incorporating them into the system as technical 
regulations. Significantly, despite their voluntary nature, these AMN standards 
tend to be followed by industry players. This does not detract from the 
importance of transforming those nonbinding standards into binding 
regulations to ensure that all players in the industry play by the same rules. In 
an attempt to address this, in 2010, the member states of Mercosur launched 
negotiations to make revising Mercosur technical regulations a more fluid and 
regular process.104 This new mechanism to enact technical regulations 
theoretically does not rely directly on functional domestic regulatory 
institutions, but it does in the case of Mercosur, because, as explained earlier, 
the AMN depends on the participation of national institutions. 
IV 
THE COMPLEX ROLE OF DOMESTIC REGULATORY STRUCTURES IN 
REGULATORY COOPERATION PROCESSES 
The previous part shows a clear contrast between competition policy and 
technical regulations in Mercosur: cooperation in competition policy faced 
many more obstacles than in the field of technical regulations. Concurrently, 
competition authorities were either nonexistent or newly created institutions in 
many countries, in contrast with those in charge of technical regulations. This 
seems to support the view that the absence of functional domestic regulatory 
institutions in the members of a trade zone may significantly hamper efforts to 
 
 101.  Res. No. 894, 11 Noviembre 2009, B.O. 23/11/2009 (Arg.). 
 102.  WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY, TRADE POLICY REVIEW REPORT BY THE 
SECRETARIAT: BRAZIL, WT/TPR/S/283, at 63 (May 17, 2013) [hereinafter BRAZIL TRADE POLICY 
REVIEW].  
 103.  O’Keefe, supra note 82, at 182.  
 104.  BRAZIL TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 102, at 63. 
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promote regulatory cooperation. At all stages of the regulatory cooperation 
process, whether in the negotiations of working groups or at the time of 
implementation, specific and functional forms of regulatory capacities are 
needed in order for the cooperation effort to be effectively implemented. 
It would be too simplistic, however, to claim that the sheer existence of 
functional domestic regulatory institutions is a guarantee of success for 
regulatory cooperation efforts. On the contrary, the field of SPS measures in 
Mercosur suggests that the role of domestic regulatory institutions is somewhat 
more complex than a straightforward question of capacity, that is, the sheer 
existence of regulatory structures or than functionality, that is, agencies that are 
fully operational. These characteristics are necessary in order to engage 
effectively in regulatory cooperation, but they are not sufficient. 
The SPS-measures example illustrates that political will plays a significant 
role in regulatory cooperation efforts. If countries are not willing to, at least 
partially, cede sovereignty to a supranational body, then the regulatory 
cooperation process will not only be dependent on the existence of functional 
domestic institutions but also on the political will of national governments to 
move forward with the process. 
Given the importance of agriculture and the agri-industry in Latin 
America,105 SPS measures are of strategic importance within Mercosur. Similar 
to TBT measures, the Mercosur mandate to generate cooperation among 
member countries in the field of SPS measures can also be traced back to the 
Treaty of Asunción.106 Nevertheless, Mercosur can hardly be said to have been 
successful in this field. 
In its initial phase of development, Mercosur intended to harmonize SPS 
measures in the region. To further this ambitious plan, Mercosur put in place 
institutional mechanisms very similar to those already mentioned in the context 
of TBTs: sub-working groups under the umbrella of the GMC. Sub-Working 
Group 8 on Agriculture has been, in this regard, particularly instrumental in the 
development of Mercosur’s harmonization agenda. As already mentioned, the 
role of these sub-working groups is to decide whether a standard—decided 
upon by a technical committee such as the Animal Health Committee or the 
Plant Health Committee107—should be elevated to the GMC for final 
 
 105.  According to the data published by the MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity, for 2012, 
three of the top five Brazilian exports are agricultural goods (soybeans, raw sugar, and poultry meat). 
Three of the top five Argentinean exports are agricultural goods (soybean meal, corn, and soybean oil). 
Four of the top five Uruguayan exports are agricultural goods (frozen beef, soybeans, rice, and wheat). 
Nine of top ten Paraguayan exports are agricultural goods (e.g., soybeans, frozen beef, rice). The 
importance of agriculture is more limited for a newer member of Mercosur, Venezuela, and a potential 
new member currently being contemplated, Bolivia—two countries that rely extensively on oil and gas. 
Alexander Simoes, The Observatory of Economic Competition, MIT, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/. 
 106.  Treaty Establishing a Common Market, supra note 13, art. 1, at 1045. 
 107.  Lengyel & Delich, supra note 17, at 210; Sebastián Leavy & Francisco Fabian Saez, 
Debilidades en la Armonización de Medidas Sanitarias y Fitosanitarias en el MERCOSUR 7 (working 
paper presented at the 47th Congress of the Soceidade Brasileira De Economía, Administração e 
Sociologia Rural, 2009).  
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adoption.108 
Although a “Mercosur SPS Code” has never come close to being written, 
significant progress toward harmonization of SPS measures was made in the 
initial years of the trade zone. The rules enacted at that time can be divided into 
the following categories:109 
1. “Framework decisions,” such as the incorporation of the WTO SPS 
Agreement,110 or a resolution establishing conformity-assessment procedures at 
the point of destination rather than at the border;111 
2. “Horizontal decisions” that apply to all products without distinction of the 
sector of activity, such as Resolution 19/93 of the GMC providing for a 
harmonized list of additives;112 and 
3. “Vertical decisions” dealing with specific sectors of activity such as 
Resolution GMC 70/93 on butter113 and Resolution GMC 111/96 on cacao.114 
After these initial years, Mercosur changed its strategy. It abandoned the 
ambitious harmonization agenda after acknowledging that full harmonization 
was too complicated and time consuming. This shift did not begin at a clear 
point in time but was introduced progressively.115 This more modest approach 
has been characterized as a “default strategy.”116 Mercosur member countries 
would pursue harmonization only when strictly required to permit intrabloc 
trade. In other words, harmonization efforts would only be conducted when 
justified by the volume of trade at stake or harmonized regulatory intervention 
appeared to be the best solution to address a specific issue.117 
Similarly to TBT, harmonization of SPS measures has also suffered from 
weak domestic implementation. First, member states appear to delay 
implementation, engaging in some degree of cherry-picking when deciding 
whether and which Mercosur instrument to implement first in their domestic 
 
 108.  Lengyel & Delich supra note 17, at 210.  
 109.  Leavy & Sáez, supra note 107, at 14.  
 110.  Decision CCM 6/96 ‘Acuerdo sobre aplicación de medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias.’ 
 111.  Grupo Mercado Común, Acta 06/94, Res. 60/94, “Inspección Fitosanitaria en Puntos de 
Destino” [“Phytosantiary Inspections at Point of Destination”] (1994); Grupo Mercado Común, Acta 
01/96, Res. 2/96, “Regimen de Certification y Verification en Puntos de Origen/Destino” [“Certification 
and Verification Regiment at Point of Destination”] (1996). 
 112.  Grupo Mercado Común, Acta 02/93, Res. 19/93, “Lista General Armonizada de Aditivios 
Mercosur” [“General Harmonized List of Additives in Mercosur”] (1993). 
 113.  Resolution GMC 70/93 ‘Reglamento Técnico de identidad y calidad de la manteca.’  
 114.  Resolution GMC 111/96 ‘Requisitos Fitosanitarios para Cacao.’ 
 115.  See Grupo Mercado Común, Acta 04/98, Res. 77/98, “Reconocimiento Mutuo de Equivalencia 
de Sistemas de Control” [“Mutual Recognition of Equivalent Systems of Control”] (1998); Grupo 
Mercado Común, Acta 03/99, Res. 60/99, “Principios, Directrices, Criterios y Parámetros para los 
Acuerdos de Equivalencia de los Sistemas de Control Sanitorios y Fitosanitarios entre los Estados 
Partes del MERCOSUR” [“Principles, Directives, Criteria and Parameters for Agreements on the 
Equivalence of Systems of Control between the MERCOSUR Member States”] (1999) (demonstrating 
a shift, which has become clearer recently, toward mutual recognition rather than harmonization, a shift 
which has become clearer recently).  
 116.  Lengyel & Delich, supra note 17, at 212. 
 117.  Id. 
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legal systems. For instance, over a period of time subject to the latest WTO 
Trade Policy Review, Paraguay focused on implementation of rules regarding 
plant products and byproducts as well as health-certification requirements for 
the import of both live animals and genetic material of various species.118 During 
the same period, Uruguay focused its implementation of Mercosur norms on 
the standards relating to the equine industry.119 
Compounding the obstacles to internalization of norms, there are areas in 
which the regulatory cooperation efforts have failed to produce any rules. The 
case of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is particularly illustrative. 
Unlike farmers in others countries, those in Mercosur countries have embraced 
genetically modified crops.120 Mercosur, however, has failed to take advantage 
of this opportunity to produce harmonized safety and quality standards for 
GMOs at the regional level.121 GMC required the Ad Hoc Group on 
Agricultural Biotechnologies to harmonize the domestic regulatory frameworks 
on biosecurity, analyze the possible coordination of the commercial application 
of GMOs, and organize consultations toward establishing a common position in 
the context of international negotiations.122 But the results have been 
disappointing.123 The documents produced by the group—such as a comparison 
of the domestic legal requirements of GMO production and labeling, and a 
report on the potential commercial applications of GMOs—have been 
characterized as descriptive, superficial, incoherent, and lacking in policy 
prescriptions.124 
With this picture in mind, academics negatively regard the results achieved 
by Mercosur in the field of SPS. Lengyel and Delich rightly point out that 
regulatory cooperation efforts in Mercosur led to very minor substantive 
harmonization; the situation could be described as one of “outright blockage.”125 
They ultimately conclude that “it could be fair to say that M[ercosur] SPS policy 
is still essentially defined at the national level, as domestic standards and 
practices are brought and powerfully defended by national officers in 
M[ercosur] meetings.”126 Zago de Azevedo also points out that use of SPS 
measures has been one of the preferred means by which Mercosur countries 
have protected their domestic agricultural producers.127 More specifically, he 
mentions a survey conducted by Mercosur that identified over eighty-two SPS 
 
 118.  Paraguay Trade Policy Report, supra note 92, at 67. 
 119.  Uruguay Trade Policy Report, supra note 91, at 76. 
 120.  Luciano M. Donadío Linares, La Construccion de la Política de Biotecnología en el 
MERCOSUR, 31 REVISTA DERECHO DEL ESTADO 191, 194 (2013). 
 121.  Id. at 195–96. 
 122.  MERCOSUR, MERCOSUR/GMC/13/04 (2004) (on file with authors). 
 123.  Linares, supra note 120, at 195. 
 124.  Linares, supra note 120, at 196. 
 125.  Lengyel & Delich, supra note 17, at 212. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  de Azevedo, supra note 17, at 598. 
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measures in force in 2000 that impeded intrabloc trade.128 More recently, Leavy 
and Fabián Sáez have shown, using the example of apian products, that even 
GMC decisions are being used by member states to protect their domestic 
markets through SPS measures, further undermining harmonization efforts.129 
The case of SPS in Mercosur illustrates why functional domestic institutions 
are necessary but not sufficient to promote regulatory cooperation. In contrast 
to competition policy, the relative failure of Mercosur in the field of SPS 
measures does not seem to be attributable to the lack of domestic regulatory 
capacity. On the contrary, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay each have functional 
sanitary services to serve the critically important agri-industry.130 Nevertheless, 
those functional regulatory agencies may well be the very reason why 
regulatory cooperation has been complicated within Mercosur. Lengyel and 
Delich suggest that Mercosur countries have been reluctant to harmonize SPS 
measures precisely because the regulators are convinced that their current 
practices and norms are “sufficient and successful.”131 Brazil132, Argentina133, and 
Uruguay134 have comprehensive SPS-related regulatory systems. Paraguay may 
be the least equipped of the four, but it always had the regulatory bodies in 
place and recent reforms have streamlined the system.135 
Lengyel and Delich’s analysis is consistent with Gardini’s description of the 
general relationship between the national political systems and the technical 
experts in the early phases of Mercosur’s development, during which Argentine 
and Brazilian experts were strictly constrained by their respective national 
political spheres: 
Especially in the early phases of the process, the results of each meeting 
were reported to and checked with top political authorities, at the ministerial 
level or even with the president himself. On the Argentine side, there was  
no degree of technical freedom during discussion . . . Each little advance was reported 
to and assessed with the presidents in both countries. The pattern seems to have only 
slightly changed under the Menem and Collor administrations . . . President Menem 
incorporated a number of technical experts to his staff and relied upon them to the 
 
 128.  Id. at 598 n.43. 
 129.  Leavy & Sáez, supra note 107, at 15–16 (analyzing Resolution GMC No. 23/07 “Requisitos 
zoosanitarios para la importación de abejas reinas y productos avícolas destinados a los estados partes” 
and concluding that, at least presumptively, the resolution is inconsistent with the Mercosur SPS 
framework decision requiring an alignment with international standards). 
 130.  Lengyel & Delich, supra note 17, at 211. 
 131.  Id. at 212. 
 132.  BRAZIL TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 102, at 65.   
 133.  WTO TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY, TRADE POLICY REVIEW REPORT BY THE 
SECRETARIAT: ARGENTINA, WT/TPR/S/277, at x (Feb. 13, 2013). 
 134.  URUGUAY TRADE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 91, at ix. 
 135.  Paraguay has been equipped with specialized bodies in charge of phytosanitary and sanitary 
regulation. In recent years, the rather fragmented regulatory SPS network was rationalized with the 
creation of SENAVE and SENACSA, respectively responsible for the phytosanitary protection and 
animal health. Furthermore, Paraguay put in place an interministerial Committee on SPS measures in 
charge of coordinating Paraguay’s SPS policies. PARAGUAY TRADE POLICY REPORT, supra note 74, at 
60–61. 
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extent that they could translate his vision of integration into practical measures. 
Within these limits, the president gave the experts total political backing . . . 
[T]echnical negotiators had all the necessary powers but these had to be strictly 
exercised within the political directions received.
136
 
In conclusion, the development of SPS measures in Mercosur shows that 
domestic institutional capabilities are a necessary, but not sufficient, 
requirement to engage in regulatory harmonization and cooperation efforts. 
Thanks to their historical and more current specializations in agri-industries, 
most Mercosur countries do have regulators with the capacity to address the 
challenges of regulatory harmonization. Initially, however, neither those 
regulators nor their governments were sympathetic to the cooperation efforts. It 
is striking to realize that the significant slowdown in the progress of regulatory 
cooperation in this field stopped at the turn of the century. In 1999, shortly after 
the Brazilian devaluation, the continent started to face significant 
macroeconomic difficulties and resorted to increased protectionism to appease 
domestic political pressures.137 Although the official harmonization efforts 
within Mercosur remain stalled, in the last fifteen years there has been an 
increase in private voluntary standards, which is not attached to or dependent 
upon government institutions.138 
The laborious development of SPS measures also illustrates that something 
more is required to put in place effective regulatory cooperation than simply 
fixing the weakness of the design of domestic regulatory institutions. In this 
particular case of Mercosur, the lack of political will of the member countries 
became a significant obstacle, especially after the macroeconomic crisis.139 One 
could possibly argue that dependence on circumstantial changes in political will 
can be avoided by delegating the cooperation process to supranational 
institutions. Although this is true, the process of giving up sovereignty in favor 
of a supranational institution is, in itself, a complex political process. If 
countries are unwilling to cede that sovereignty, this may not be an option. At 
the domestic level, one could suggest that independent regulatory agencies may 
be more effective at insulating regulatory policies from political, and perhaps 
populist, concerns. This may be true to a certain extent, because the 
government can always implement measures to curtail regulatory 
independence. Moreover, there is no guarantee that regulatory independence 
will not be coupled with regulatory capture or that the regulatory cooperation 
process will not be guided by powerful interest groups rather than the concerns 
of a democratically elected government.140  Thus, it is not fully clear if regulatory 
independence would be an appropriate solution to this problem. 
 
 136.  GARDINI, supra note 16, at 123 (footnotes omitted). 
 137.  See Lengyel & Delich, supra note 17, at 211–12.  
 138.  Id. at 217. 
 139.  GARDINI, supra note 16, at 124 (“‘Technification’ of problems may have facilitated consensus 
on the measures to be implemented, but this technical consensus seems more the product of strong 
political indications and commitment rather than autonomous technical evaluation or common 
backgrounds.”). 
 140.  Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. OF ECON. 335, 335–58 (1974). 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
This article tries to shed new light on regulatory cooperation efforts by 
calling attention to the importance of domestic regulatory structures. 
Depending on the regional institutional arrangement, domestic institutions may 
matter more or less to regulatory cooperation. The most ambitious type of 
cooperation—harmonization—requires states to decide on the institutional 
design of technical and political fora where decisions will be made. The creation 
of supranational institutions to drive harmonization efforts is likely to result in a 
process of harmonization that is highly independent from domestic institutions. 
However, designing such supranational institutions is not an easy task; they are 
complex bureaucracies and their implementation can be rather expensive. 
Moreover, the decisions of supranational institutions have far-reaching 
consequences on the health of populations and the competitiveness of member 
countries’ economies. Thus, a great deal of political support must be gathered 
for these supranational institutions to be effectively implemented. 
In contrast to this institutional arrangement, the case study of Mercosur 
illustrates a process of regulatory cooperation dependent upon an arrangement 
comprised of domestic institutions. Beyond the institutional weaknesses of 
Mercosur itself, a theme that has been explored by a relatively vast literature,141 
Mercosur’s failure to successfully implement its full harmonization agenda—at 
least in competition policy, technical regulations, and SPS measures—may be at 
least partly due to the inadequacy of domestic institutions in member countries. 
Although the cases discussed in this article illustrate the relevance of 
domestic institutions in regulatory cooperation efforts, they raise a series of 
interesting questions to be investigated by future research. One of these 
questions is related to other countries and regions: Is it possible to use this 
institutional hypothesis to explain failures in other regions of the world? 
Comparative case studies may shed light on the relative importance of the 
unique political and economic factors of the Latin American region vis-à-vis the 
more generalizable institutional hypothesis. Another question relates to the 
novelty of regulatory functions. Some of the rules on which harmonization has 
been attempted have existed, in one form or another, for decades in many 
countries. For other countries, they have not. The contrast between quality 
control over food, and control of corporate mergers and acquisitions, for 
instance, illustrates this point. Whereas quality control for food is more intuitive 
and may be more familiar in most countries, control over mergers and 
acquisitions is fairly recent and somewhat unfamiliar to many countries. Thus, 
 
 141.  See, e.g., J. AE. Vervaele, Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America, 54 INT’L AND 
COMP. L. Q. 387 (2005); J. Kleinheisterkamp, Legal Certainty in the MERCOSUR: The Uniform 
Interpretation of Community Law (2000) 6 NAFTA LAW & BUS. REV. OF THE AMS. 5 (2000); C. F. Dri, 
Limits of the Institutional Mimesis of the European Union: The Case of the Mercosur Parliament 1 
LATIN AM. POL’Y 52 (2005); W. Fernandez, El Nuevo Tribunal Arbitral del Mercosur, ANUARIO DE 
DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINO AMERICANO 595 (2006). 
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the question here is: To what extent does regulatory cooperation depend on 
long-lasting institutional cultures that inform governmental policies and guide 
players in the industry but that go beyond the sheer existence of a regulatory 
body with that specific function? 
Though these questions are beyond the scope of this article, they are 
prompted by this article’s contribution to an emerging literature on 
international trade: some institutional arrangements designed to promote 
regulatory cooperation at the regional level may be largely dependent on the 
existence and operation of domestic regulatory institutions, as is the case in 
Mercosur. When parties to international trade agreements do not have the 
adequate domestic institutions to comply with their obligations, failure of the 
entire agreement may ensue. Accordingly, this article pushes for a greater 
recognition of the importance of these domestic institutions in order to facilitate 
a more informed conversation about whether and how to effectively address 
this issue. Any possible lessons or policy prescriptions require further 
investigation of the questions mentioned above. But this article at least starts 
this important conversation. 
 
